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The  paper  explores  the  incentives  for  an  incumbent  firm  to  acquire  an  entrant  willing  to  sell  a  product 
innovation, rather than openly compete with this entrant and, in case of acquisition, the incentives to sell 
simultaneously both the existing products and the new one, rather than specializing on a single variant. We 
prove that, in some circumstances, an incumbent firm can find it profitable to make an acquisition proposal to 
the entrant in order to deter entry. Nevertheless, in this acquisition scenario, a product proliferation strategy is 
never observed at equilibrium. Rather, the incumbent restricts itself to offer either its own variant or the 
product innovation produced by the entrant, depending on the quality differential existing between them. It 
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ABSTRACT
The paper explores the incentives for an incumbent
￿rm to acquire an entrant willing to sell a product in-
novation, rather than openly compete with this entrant
and, in case of acquisition, the incentives to sell simul-
taneously both the existing products and the new one,
rather than specializing on a single variant. We prove
that, in some circumstances, an incumbent ￿rm can ￿nd
it pro￿table to make an acquisition proposal to the en-
trant in order to deter entry. Nevertheless, in this acqui-
sition scenario, a product proliferation strategy is never
observed at equilibrium. Rather, the incumbent restricts
itself to o⁄er either its own variant or the product inno-
vation produced by the entrant, depending on the quality
di⁄erential existing between them. It follows that, while
being available for sale, sometimes the innovation simply
remains unexploiteda.
1 Introduction
The paper explores (i) the incentives for an incumbent
￿rm to acquire an entrant willing to sell a product in-
novation, rather than openly compete with this entrant,
and (ii), in case of acquisition, the incentives to sell si-
multaneously both the existing products and the new
one, rather than specializing on a single variant. These
questions are intimately related to the problem of inno-
vation. In the case of product innovation, who, from the
incumbent or the inventor, has the stronger incentive to
appropriate the bene￿ts expected from its sales? What-
ever the answer, will both variants survive in the market?
While similar questions have been extensively considered
for the case of process innovation (see Gallini (1984),
Reinganum (1983), Gans and Stern(2000), Gilbert and
Newbery (1982), among others), it seems to have been
at least partially put aside in the case of product innova-
tion. However, process and product innovations do gen-
erally go hand in hand, since a technological innovation
is often viewed as successful either when it decreases sub-
a*We are grateful to Paul Belle￿amme for insightful comments and
suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
**Professor Emeritus CORE, 34 voie du roman pays, Belgium,
e-mail address: jean.gabszewicz2uclouvain.be
***Ornella Tarola, assistant Professor, University of Rome
"La Sapienza", Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5, Italy. E-mail address:
ornella.tarola2fastwebnet.it Tel : 00323485847668.
stantially the production costs, and/or when it gives rise
to a variant of the product which is unanimously ranked
by consumers as being at the top of the existing quality
ladderb.
The questions raised in this paper arise because
technological innovators are often di⁄erent from those
who commercialize the products coming out from their
inventions. While the former are frequently research-
oriented startup ￿rms, the latter are rather market in-
cumbents traditionally specialized in marketing the prod-
ucts and promoting their sales.This specialization of ac-
tivities opens the door to potential competition between
the incumbent(s) and the innovator since the latter can
possibly threaten the former to commercialize itself its
new variant if the incumbent ￿rm(s) does not accept to
pay a su¢ ciently high price for the right of selling it. The
question is whether it would be more pro￿table for the in-
cumbent to keep its own existing variant without launch-
ing in the market the new one, and incurring thereby the
costs of competition, or to pay a signi￿cant acquisition
price to the innovator to let him to delegate its power of
launching it. The forces in presence are well described by
Gans and Stern (2000): "when startup innovators and es-
tablished ￿rms cooperate at the commercialization stage,
the bargaining power of each party (and thus the distrib-
ution of rents) depends, on the one hand, on the ability of
the startup to threaten to enter the product market and
impose competitive costs on the incumbent and, on the
other hand, on the ability of the incumbent to threaten
to expropriate the (improved variant resulting from) the
startup￿ s technology".
When the potential entrant decides to manufacture
its new, higher quality, variant, we enter the world of
competition in a vertically di⁄erentiated market: the in-
cumbents sell the low quality variants while the entrant
proposes to consumers a variant which is unanimously
ranked by them at the top of the quality ladder. Then
competition takes place among a larger number of vari-
ants than before entryc. By contrast, when the poten-
bSeveral papers have explored the incidence of entry on compe-
tition in vertically di⁄erentiated market when competition takes
place via price strategies; see in particular, Bonisseau J.M. and R.
Lahmandi-Ayed (2006), Constantatos, C.and S. Perrakis (1997),
Martinez-Giralt (1989) and Donnenfeld. S. and S. Weber (1979)
cThis statement should be tempered by the fact that, in vertically
di⁄erentiated markets, the sale of a higher quality product can en-
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tial entrant is acquired at some price by an incumbent
￿rm, several alternative scenarios can be observed. Ei-
ther the acquirer introduces the new product and with-
draws its existing variant from the market. Then, neither
the number of variants nor the number of ￿rms increase.
This is observed in several di⁄erentiated markets. Sig-
ni￿cant examples are the products from the electronics
and telecommunications industries, like new laptops or
computer screens when faster processors, or screens with
higher resolution, are discovered: the new versions enter
the market, while their existing counterparts are with-
drawn. Similarly, software with improved applications
generally replace the old ones which are simply with-
drawnd. Notice that, o⁄ering only the acquired variant
enables the incumbent to escape from the erosion of its
monopoly pro￿ts due to cannibalization.
Or the acquirer can decide to introduce the new ac-
quired product innovation while keeping the existing one
on sale. Then, a larger number of variants than before
acquisition are sold while the number of ￿rms operat-
ing in the market remains the same. This is observed
for instance with the persistence of traditional cellular
phones after the introduction of I-Pods, or the temporary
survival of black and white TV-sets after the introduc-
tion of colour TV￿ s in television manufacturing. Even if
the number of ￿rms has not increased, one should ex-
pect harsher competition in the market among existing
variants simply because selling also the new variant in-
creases for the acquirer the danger of cannibalizing its
own existing product. Still, selling both the new and the
old one could allow for price discrimination between con-
sumers, selling the new, top quality, variant to consumers
with higher willingness to pay or higher revenue, and the
standard variant to poorer or less motivated consumers.
In order to analyze the incentives of incumbent ￿rms
to move along a speci￿c scenario among those which were
just evoked, we start focusing on a natural duopoly where
a monopolist providing a single variant whose quality is
exogenously given is threatened by a potential entrant.
When entering the market, this rival o⁄ers a new vari-
ant whose quality is at the top of the quality ladder.
With the aim of deterring entry, the incumbent ￿rm can
make an acquisition proposal to this entrant. The lat-
ter may either accept, or deny the acquisition proposal.
When the acquisition proposal is accepted, the monopo-
list can decide either to market both its own variant and
tail the exit from the market of a lower quality one; see Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1980).
dThese examples are borrowed from Siebert (2002).
the product innovation produced by the rival, or restrict
itself to o⁄er only one of the two variants. In other words,
he decides whether he privileges product proliferation, or
product specialisation. As for the innovator, he/she can
accept this proposal or turn it down and enter the market
via de novo entry. We study under which conditions an
acquisition agreement is more pro￿table than open com-
petition to both parties. Would it be the case, we show
however that a product proliferation strategy is never ob-
served at equilibrium.
To examine how robust is the above conclusion, we
then extend the analysis and assume now that the ex-
isting market initially consists of two incumbent ￿rms,
providing variants of di⁄erent quality exogenously given,
say, high and low. In line with the above, we assume
that a potential entrant contemplates to enter this mar-
ket with a quality which can be either at the top of the
existing quality ladder, or at the intermediate level. In
the ￿rst case, the new variant constitutes an absolute
product innovation since it dominates in quality both the
existing variants. In this ￿rst scenario, the game is as fol-
lows. At the ￿rst stage, the high quality incumbent ￿rm
makes an acquisition proposal to the innovator, who can
accept or reject the proposal. In case of acquisition, the
buyer decides between product proliferation and product
specialization. Otherwise, de novo entry is observed. In
the second scenario, the new variant constitutes a rela-
tive product innovation since it dominates in quality the
existing low quality variant, but it is still dominated by
the variant o⁄ered by the other high quality incumbent
￿rm. The game we study in this alternative setting now
develops along three stages as we contemplate the chance
that even the low-quality incumbent can acquire the en-
trant, if no acquisition agreement has been reached by
the innovator and the high quality incumbent at the ￿rst
stage of the game. Accordingly,a de novo entry can only
arise as a third-stage best strategy.
Our main conclusion is that, in some circumstances,
an incumbent ￿rm can ￿nd it pro￿table to make an ac-
quisition proposal to the entrant in order to deter en-
try. Nevertheless, in this acquisition scenario, a product
proliferation strategy is never observed at equilibrium.
Rather, the incumbent restricts itself to o⁄er either its
own variant or the product innovation produced by the
entrant, depending on the quality di⁄erential existing ini-
tially between them. Thus, a surprising corollary of this
is that while being available for sale, sometimes the in-
novation simply remains unexploited!3
2 The case of one incumbent ￿rm
Consider a market with an incumbent ￿rm o⁄ering some
variant i of a good to a population of consumers identi￿ed
by the parameter ￿ 2 [a;b]; 0 < a < b and 2a < b <
4a; and uniformly distributed with density equal to 1e.
The demand model is directly inspired from traditional
models of vertical product di⁄erentiation (see Mussa and
Rosen, 1978; Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). Letting ui
denote the quality of variant i; the utility of consumer ￿
is given by
￿ui ￿ pi;
with pi; denoting the price that customers pay for getting
the variant provided by ￿rm i. The average cost with
respect to quality is assumed to be constant and, without
loss of generality, we set it equal to zero. Accordingly,












2 : Substituting this price in (1), we















Now assume that a potential rival ￿rm has discovered
some alternative variant of the product which is of higher
quality than the variant proposed by the incumbent: here
we are not interested in the innovation process which
has led to this product innovation, like in Gallini (1984),
Reinganum (1983), Gans and Stern(2000), Gilbert and
Newbery (1982), among others. Rather, we concentrate
on the threat that this product innovation exerts in the
market on the incumbent￿ s pro￿ts. In order to bar en-
try, the incumbent monopolist can make an acquisition
proposal to the rival and thereby avoid to openly com-
pete with him/her while getting the innovation produced
by the rival. Under acquisition, the incumbent can also
decide whether o⁄ering both its own variant and the
innovation produced by the rival, or destroys one vari-
ant, whathever it is. If the acquisition agreement is not
reached, then a de novo entry takes place, and the two
￿rms compete in price. Accordingly, in this scenario, the
incumbent and the entrant get equilibrium pro￿ts ￿
￿
L
eThis assumption guarantees that competition develops in a nat-
ural duopoly framework: exactly two ￿rms, and no more, can make
strictly positive pro￿ts at an interior price equilibrium.
and ￿
￿































We study in a non cooperative game when acquisition
is observed at equilibrium, and, if any, whether one or
two variants are made available by the acquirer in the
market. In other words, we examine when acquisition
entails product proliferation.
Proposition 1 In the case the incumbent decides to ac-
quire the potential entrant, it is never pro￿table to sell
both its own variant and the acquired one simultaneously:
only the acquired variant is selected for sale.
Proof. It su¢ ces to notice that when the two variants
H and L are sold, the maximization of monopoly prof-





with respect to pH given that p￿
L = auL; gives the
equilibrium price p￿
H = 1
2 (buH + 2auL ￿ buL): Thus,





4(b￿a) : As the di⁄erence between this
value ￿￿H+L and the monopoly pro￿ts ￿
￿




uL (b ￿ 2a)
2 ; we conclude immediately that o⁄er-
ing only the highest quality variant H is always more
pro￿table than selling both the available variants H and
L: Q.E.D.
Now, it remains to check when acquiring the innova-
tor constitutes the best strategy for the monopolist and
the intrant. To this end, it su¢ ces to compare the prof-
its under acquisition at some acquisition price with the




be the monopoly revenues of the incumbent when o⁄er-



























duopoly revenues accruing to the high quality entrant
and the henceforth low quality incumbent, respectively,
in the case of de novo entry. From the viewpoint of
the incumbent, an acquisition proposal turns out to be
pro￿table if and only if the monopoly pro￿ts ￿M
H af-
ter paying an acquistion price Pa are still higher than
the duopoly pro￿ts ￿
￿
L derived from open competition
with the high quality rival. On the entrant￿ s perspec-
tive, the acquisition proposal is acceptable if the acqui-
sition price Pa is at least equal to the pro￿ts it would
obtain via entering the market and openly competing,
namely ￿
￿




which guarantees that the entrant would accept the4
deal. On the other hand, an acquisition agreement is
preferred to a de novo entry strategy from the view-
point of the incumbent i⁄: ￿M




















The function f(uH) is strictly positive when uH =
uL: On the other hand, the left-hand term of this expres-
sion is a linear strictly decreasing function of uH in the
acceptable range of a and b-values. Consequently, it has
a positive root u￿





5a2 ￿ 8ab + 5b2￿
uL
(11b ￿ 10a)(b ￿ 2a)
:
Thus the function f(uH) is positive at the left of u￿
H; be-
tween uL and u￿
H;and negative on its right. Accordingly,
when uL < uH < u￿
H; the di⁄erence f(uH) is positive
guaranteeing in particular that, when uH is close to uL,
it is always better to acquire than openly compete. On
the contrary, when the quality of the entrant￿ s variant
becomes by far larger than the quality proposed by the
incumbent, pro￿ts under open competition become more
important for both parties because they start to consti-
tute "local monopolies", the incumbent specialising on
the consumers with a lower willingness to pay and the
entrant on the class of those customers with more in-
tense preferences for the good. Also the acquisition price
starts to be very high, discouraging the incumbent to
acquire. Thus, we conclude that
Proposition 2 There always exists a nonnull domain of
uH-values [uL;u￿
H] for which it is advantageous for the
incumbent and the entrant to reach an acquisition agree-
ment rather than openly compete. When uL < uH < u￿
H;
acquisition is prefered to open competition while, when
the reverse inequality holds, open competition is prefered
to acquisition.
An immediate corollary of the above proposition is
that it is always better to acquire than to compete for
all values of uH satisfying the inequality uH < u￿
H.
The two above propositions are quite in accordance
with intuition. When the product innovation is "weak",
in the sense that it does not constitute a substantial im-
provement with respect to the existing variant, compe-
tition could be very harmful to both ￿rms because the
two variants are almost homogeneous products and both
pro￿ts are close to zero under price competition. So there
exists a strong incentive both for the incumbent and the
innovator to avoid open competition and prefer accord-
ingly acquisition. On the contrary, when the intrant of-
fers a variant which is substantially of much higher qual-
ity than the existing one o⁄ered by the incumbent, the
former has a strong bargaining position with respect to
the latter and can require such a high price from him that
both ￿rms ￿nd more advantageous to opt for a non coop-
erative behaviour and openly compete. This advantage
is even reinforced because, due their local monopoly po-
sitions, competition becomes less harmful to the parties.
3 The case of two incumbent ￿rms
It is important to examine the robustness of the above
proposition, obtained in the case of a single incumbent.
In particular, does this conclusion holds as well when the
market is initially shared by two incumbent ￿rms simul-
taneously threatened by the entry of a further competi-
tor? To examine this problem, consider now a covered
market with two incumbent ￿rms, say ￿rm H (high qual-
ity variant) and ￿rm L (low quality variant), respectively.
Pro￿ts accruing to these ￿rms write as (3) and (4), re-
spectively. As in the previous setting, we still assume
that a potential entrant, ￿rm F; contemplates to enter
the market with a variant which can be a priori either at
the top of the quality ladder (absolute product innova-
tion) or in between the existing variants (relative product
innovation). We analyse how the incumbent ￿rms can re-
act to this threat. We start analysing the case when the
innovation is at the top of the quality ladder. In this
scenario, when entering the market, the entrant can be
acquired by the high quality incumbent ￿rm H. Then,
we consider the alternative case when the innovation lies
in-between the high and the low quality variant. Accord-
ingly, in the case of relative innovation, the innovator can
be a priori acquired by both by the high quality incum-
bent and the low quality one.
Of course, equilibrium prices and pro￿ts are di⁄er-
ent functions of the qualities uH; uL and uF (and of the
parameters a and b) according as uF is larger than uH
or in-between uL and uH. For sake of generality, we
provide below the equilibrium pro￿ts for a general three
￿rms-covered market case with three ￿rms 1;2 and 3 such
that u1 ￿ u2 ￿ u3: This analysis embeds the two scenar-
ios mentioned above, as it is su¢ cient to replace u1;u2
and u3 with uL;uH;uF (case i) and uL;uF;uH (case ii),
respectively, to cover the two possible cases.
It is easy to check that when the three ￿rms compete
against each other, given the natural duopoly setting,5
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Accordingly, in the two cases when either uF > uH > uL
or uH > uF > uL; the equilibrium revenues accru-









1) > 0; respec-
tively. Thus, it follows that, in both scenarios, the en-
trant can pro￿tably enters the market. However, the low






3.1 Absolute product innovation: uF > uH > uL
In order to derive the equilibrium path in this scenario,
namely, uF > uH > uL; we look for a subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium in a non cooperative sequential
entry/acquisition game which, in the case of absolute in-
novation, develops along two stages:
1. at the ￿rst stage, the incumbent ￿rm H o⁄ers to buy
the entrant at some price PH (we set PH equal to 0
if the ￿rm does not want to acquire ￿rm F) and, in
case of acquisition, the buyer decides whether to sell
both the variants uH and uF, or only one of them;
2. If ￿rm F turns down its o⁄er, at the second stage,
it enters the market via de novo entryg.
Solving the game backwards, we start from the sec-
ond stage and thus consider ￿rst when a de novo entry
can take place in the market at equilibrium. To this end
we assume that ￿rm H at the ￿rst stage has not reached
an acquisition agreement with ￿rm F; which accordingly
enters the market if it is a pro￿table choice. We ￿rst
check whether, in the case of acquisition, it is pro￿table
for the incumbent to o⁄er both the available variants uH
and uF; or only one of them; clarifying afterwards under
fSee Appendix for details on computing these equilibrium values.
gOf course, in the alternative case of relative innovation, the se-
quential game develops along three stages, as a further intermedi-
ate stage where the acquisition proposal is made by the low quality
incumbent takes place. Thus, if ￿rm F turns down the acquisition
o⁄er by the high quality incumbent at the ￿rst stage, at the second
stage ￿rm L o⁄ers to buy ￿rm F at some price PL and, in the case
of acquisition, the buyer decides whether to sell both variants uL
and uF; or only one of them. Accordingly, a de novo entry, if any,
can be observed only at the third stage of the game.
which circumstances acquisition is more pro￿table than
open competition. For future reference, let us write rev-
enues accruing to the three ￿rms under de novo entry
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The acquisition scenario: product prolifera-
tion vs product specialisation
Under acquisition, the buyer can o⁄er both the vari-
ants uF and uH, or restrict itself to market only one
variant: Of course, in the latter case, it always prefers
to o⁄er the entrant￿ s variant uF as, ceteris paribus, the
wider the quality di⁄erence between variants, the higher
the pro￿ts at equilibrium. Let us brie￿ y consider pro￿ts
accruing to the competing ￿rms in both the above evoked
cases.
If the incumbent provides both variants uF and uH,
pro￿t functions ￿
F+H
H (pH;pL;pF) and ￿
F+H
L (pH;pL)















pH for the incumbent H and
￿
F+H
L (pH;pL) = (
pH￿pL
uH￿uL ￿ a)pL; for the other incum-
bent L: Maximization of these two expressions with re-
spect to pH and pL, respectively, gives the corresponding















(b ￿ 2a)(uH ￿ uL):
Finally, replacing these prices in ￿
F+H
H (pH;pL;pF), we
obtain the resulting equilibrium pro￿ts ￿
￿F+H
H for the











36(b￿a) : In the case
when ￿rm H decides to provide the market only
with the entrant￿ s variant uF, then the pro￿ts ac-









































Proposition 3 In the case of acquisition, o⁄ering only
the entrant￿ s quality uF is more pro￿table to the incum-
bent ￿rm H than o⁄ering both variants.
Let us now analyse the incentives to reach an ac-
quisition agreement, with only the innovation uF to be
marketed.
Acquisition vs de novo entry
On the one hand, in order to be accepted, the acqui-
sition proposal should yield the innovator a revenue RH
at least equal to the revenue when entering the market
via de novo entry, namely ￿
entry
F : On the other hand,
it is convenient for the incumbent H to make such a







obtained when acquiring the incumbent L after paying
the acquisition price RH = ￿
entry
F are larger than the
pro￿ts it would get if the potential entrant would enter
the market via a de novo entry strategy, namely ￿
entry
H .
Accordingly, we can state that this acquisition takes
place i⁄the pro￿ts that the two ￿rms would get under ac-
quisition are higher than the corresponding pro￿ts under
a de novo entry scenario, or
￿
+
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;
De novo entry
















Let us denote by x the value b=a; l the value uH￿uL,
and f the value uF ￿ uH. Thus, the sign of the di⁄er-











(b￿a)(4uF￿uH￿3uL)2 has the same sign as the sec-












under the assumption that x 2 [2;4]: Notice
that,
@P(f;x)
@x > 0 for any x 2 [2;4]: As P(f;2) > 0
we conclude that, the above di⁄erence is positive in the
admissible range of x and thus acquiring is better than
competing.
Proposition 4 In the case of absolute innovation, the
incentive for marketing the innovation by acquisition is
stronger than the incentive for marketing it by entry.
Notice that the above proposition justi￿es ex-post
the reason why, in case of absolute product innovation, it
is useless to introduce an intermediate stage allowing for
acquisition of the entrant by the low incumbent: such an
acquisition would never be part of the equilibrium path.
3.2 Relative product innovation: uH > uF > uL
It is worth noting that the acquisition strategy turns out
to belong to the path of a perfect subgame NE also in
the case when the quality provided by the entrant lies in
the middle of the quality ladder. Let us brie￿ y examine
the second and ￿rst stages of the sequential game corre-
sponding to this case. First of all, we know that, at the
third stage of the game, there is room for a de novo entry
when the variant sold by the entrant lies in the middle
of the quality ladderh.
Accordingly, let us start by studying the second stage
of the game. First, it is easy to prove that in the case
of acquisition at the second stage, the low quality in-
cumbent restricts its optimal selling strategy to its own
variant uL rather than to the entrant￿ s varianti: Thus,
it remains to clarify whether, under the assumption that
uL < uF < uH; the acquisition agreement between the
low quality incumbent and the entrant with uL only sold
in the market is pro￿table. Notice that, in this scenario,
the resulting acquisition price the low quality incumbent
has to pay when acquiring the entrant, is lower than the
one corresponding to the case when the variant uF is at
the top. Given this, it can be proved that the acqui-
sition agreement turns out to be the second stage best
strategy in some circumstances, precisely when the ratio
x = b=a is large and the entrant￿ s quality uF is not dif-
ferent enough from that of one of the two incumbents so
as to ensure mild competition and substantial entrant￿ s
pro￿ts j. Indeed, in both the above described cases, one
should expect competition after de novo entry to be very
￿erce and lead accordingly to low entrant￿ s pro￿ts, priv-
ileging an acquisition strategy rather than open compe-
tition.
Now, we analyse whether acquisition can take place
at the ￿rst stage of the game, in the case when it is
not observed at the second stage. By applying the same
hthis would be only prevented when the entrant would be at the
bottom of the quality ladder.
iIndeed, the larger the gap between the variants in the market and
the higher the resulting pro￿ts. Further, even in the case when
both the variants uF and uL would be o⁄ered; the price of the low
quality variant at equilibrium would still be equal to zero.
jSee Appendix for details.7
argument developed before, one could show that in the
case of acquisition, at the ￿rst stage of the game o⁄ering
the variant uF is no longer pro￿table, the optimal sell-
ing strategy for the high quality incumbent being now
to o⁄er only variant uH. Not even, a product prolifera-
tion strategy with both the variants uF and uH sold can
be observed at equilibrium: in this case, the high qual-
ity incumbent would gain some further pro￿ts from con-
sumers switching from the low quality variant uL to the
intermediate variant uF. Nevertheless, it would su⁄er a
loss in revenues from those consumers switching from the
high quality variant uH to the intermediate one. Finally,
given this, it can be proved that an acquisition agreement
is pro￿table at the ￿rst stage with uH being sold only,
when the ratio x is small or F￿ s quality di⁄ers substan-
tially from H￿ s and L￿ s so as to make entry a credible
threat. By combining the above ￿ndings, we can state
the following:
Proposition 5 In the case of relative innovation, an ac-
quisition agreement, either at the ￿rst stage or at the
second stage of the game, is always prefered to a de novo
entry.
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence, whoever the acquiring incumbent, commer-
cializing the innovation is detrimental for the incum-
bent￿ s pro￿t. Thus we conclude that:
Proposition 6 In the case of relative innovation, when-
ever there is acquisition, the innovation is always left un-
exploited.
The above proposition is interesting from a double
viewpoint. The ￿rst is that, in the case of relative prod-
uct innovation and acquisition, the improved variant is
simply destroyed since neither incumbent is willing to
commercialize it! The second is that, under absolute
product innovation, the acquirer of the innovative ￿rm
decides to sell the product which it has acquired. Ac-
quisition is motivated not only by the fear of harsher
competition, but also by the desire to increase the prof-
its by selling the innovated product. By contrast, in the
case of relative product innovation, the only purpose for
acquiring the entrant is to dampen competition since the
acquirer never sells the improved variant!
4 Conclusion
Mergers￿ activities resulting from ￿rms￿ specialization
through innovative research on the one hand, and com-
merce and marketing on the other hand, are more and
more frequently observed in the life of industries. These
mergers seriously a⁄ect the trajectories of innovation
which depend today on market competition among ￿rms.
As stated in the introduction, research and innovation
which were performed before inside the ￿rms, are of-
ten nowadays delegated to research-oriented startups.
The traditional Schumpeterian view of "creative destruc-
tion"does not apply anymore in this context since the
process of creative destruction supposes that innovation
takes place inside the ￿rm, and not be externalized to
other economic agents.
On the other hand, by changing the number and
characteristics of the variants supplied in the indus-
try, or by reducing the number of competitors, these
mergers￿ activities have substantially altered the nature
of competition in the market, compared with the tradi-
tional e⁄ects of entry under open competition. Indeed,
one should expect competition after de novo entry to
be very ￿erce and lead to low entrant￿ s pro￿ts, privileg-
ing accordingly an acquisition strategy rather than open
competition. A priori preventing entry by acquisition of
potential entrants seems to be a natural way for incum-
bent ￿rms to protect the market against increased com-
petition. Nevertheless, entry prevention has been mainly
considered from the viewpoint of price strategies. The ef-
fects of these two types of modus operandi for preventing
entry,-acquisition or price strategies-, should be di⁄eren-
tiated. Using price strategies in order to bar entry gen-
erally a⁄ects competition because it reduces the number
of variants, compared with the number of variants which
would have existed if entry had been successful. Under
acquisition, the outcome is a priori unclear. It depends
whether the acquirer decides to sell simultaneously both
its own product and the product it has acquired, or only
a single variant, either its own one or the variant it has
decided to acquire. In this paper, we have analyzed this
problem under vertical product di⁄erentiation in the case
of a single incumbent ￿rm facing entry, then extending
the analysis to the case of two incumbent ￿rms. Our main
conclusion is that an acquisition agreement between the
incumbent ￿rm(s) and the potential entrant can indeed
be observed at equilibrium. Still, product proliferation
is never observed at equilibrium: the acquirer always de-
cides, in case of acquisition, to sell only a single vari-
ant. Of course the variant selected depends at which level
of the quality ladder is located the quality proposed by
the entrant, compared with the qualities previously of-
fered by the incumbents.A surprising conclusion is that,
in some circumstances (relative product innovation), the
product innovation remains unexploited along the equi-8
librium path due to price competition among ￿rms, re-
vealing thereby that market environments can in￿ uence
innovation trajectories.
Economic theorists were always interested in analyz-
ing how the number and the nature of ￿rms a⁄ect com-
petition among them. They started exploring this ques-
tion in the framework of a homogeneous product market,
moving later to the analysis of competition in a world of
product di⁄erentiation. Nowadays, they notice that ￿rms
try to resist to the threat of entry by using strategies of
acquisition. The use of such strategies may considerably
a⁄ect both the competition in the market and the inno-
vation paths, since ￿rms are not necessarly constrained
to commercialize the new improved variants of the prod-
ucts, or can delay their sale to bene￿t from alternative
market conditions. This paper constitutes a tentative
to explore rigorously some implications of this strategic
renewal of ￿rms.
5 Appendix
For sake of generality, we provide below the equilibrium
pro￿ts for a general three ￿rms-covered market case with
three ￿rms 1;2 and 3 such that u1 ￿ u2 ￿ u3: Of course,
this analysis embeds the two scenarios mentioned above,
as it is su¢ cient to replace u1;u2 and u3 with uL;uH;uF
case (i) and uL;uF;uH (case ii), respectively, to cover
the two cases of absolute and relative innovation.
The consumer ￿
3 indi⁄erent between being served by






while the consumer ￿
2 indi⁄erent between buying vari-







Accordingly, the corresponding demand functions
D3(p3;p2) and D2(p3;p2;p1) for the ￿rms 1;2 and 3, re-
spectively, are















for ￿rm 1. Thus, the respective pro￿ts functions write
as















From the ￿rst order conditions, it is easy to identify the













(pL + a(u1 ￿ u2))
2
:
Thus, solving the above system, we derive the candidate
equilibrium prices ~ p3; ~ p2 and ~ p1, namely
~ p3 =








(u2 ￿ u1)(3au1 + (b ￿ 4a)u3 + (a ￿ b)u2)
6(u3 ￿ u1)
:
Notice however that due to the natural duopoly assump-





4u3 ￿ 3u1 ￿ u2
; (5)
which, in turn, implies that
(3au1 + (b ￿ 4a)u3 + (a ￿ b)u2)
6(u3 ￿ u1)
￿ 0
or, equivalently, ~ p1 ￿ 0: Accordingly, when the condition
: 2a < b < 4a is satis￿ed, then the equilibrium value of
p1 is equal to 0. In that case, the value of best replies
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4b2(u3 ￿ u1)2(u3 ￿ u2)







b2(u3 ￿ u1)(u3 ￿ u2)(u2 ￿ u1)







Proof of Proposition 5. Let us start with the
￿rst part of the Proposition and focus on the second-
stage best strategy. To this end, let us remark that at
the second stage of the game, an acquisition agreement
is preferred to a de novo entry strategy i⁄pro￿ts from de
novo entry are lower than pro￿ts from acquisition after
paying the acquisition price which is equal to zero (as the
low quality ￿rm can no longer be active in the market in
the case of de novo entry, and thus its post-entry pro￿ts
are equal to zero), namely:
b2 (uH ￿ uL)(uL ￿ uF)(uF ￿ uH)
(b ￿ a)(3uL ￿ 4uH + uF)
2 ￿




Let us denote by ￿ the value uH ￿uL; and by ￿ the
value uH ￿ uF. The sign of the above di⁄erence has the
same sign as the expression
￿(￿ ￿ ￿)
(3￿ + ￿)2 ￿
1
9
(x ￿ 2)2; (6)
given that we have assumed x 2 [2;4]; in order to ensure
that two, and only two, ￿rms can make positive pro￿ts
in this market. Denote by ￿￿ and ￿+ the roots of the
second-order polynomial P(￿) de￿ned by
P(￿) = 9￿(￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ (3￿ + ￿)2(x ￿ 2)2:
Notice that (i) the sign of P(￿) is the sign of (6) ,
and that (ii) P(￿) is strictly negative for all ￿ when-
ever ￿61 + 64x ￿ 16x2 > 0,, x 2 [
p
3
4 + 2;4] : The
polynomial P(￿) has two roots equal to, respectively























￿4x+x2+13 ): Then, we can state
the following:
(i) whenever x 2 [
p
3
4 + 2;4]; it is more pro￿table to
acquire, whatever the value of ￿;
(ii) when x 2 [2;
p
3
4 + 2[ it is more pro￿table to
acquire whenever ￿ 2 [0;￿￿) or ￿ 2 (￿+;￿]; and to enter
whenever ￿ 2 (￿￿;￿+): The two options are indi⁄erent
to each other when ￿ = ￿￿ or ￿ = ￿+:
Now, let us move to analyse the second part of the
proposition and consider the ￿rst-stage best strategy.
At the ￿rst stage of the game, an acquisition agree-











9(b￿a) < 0: The sign of this di⁄erence is the
same as the sign of the expression
4￿x2￿
(3￿ + ￿)2 +
x2￿(￿ ￿ ￿)




Simple calculations reveal that the above expression is
always negative in the range of admissible values (
￿
￿ 2
[0;1]; x 2 [2;4]): Q.E.D.
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